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Abstract
Prior work inspired by compression algorithms has described
how the Burrows Wheeler Transform can be used to create a
distance measure for bioinformatics problems. We describe
issues with this approach that were not widely known, and in-
troduce our new Burrows Wheeler Markov Distance (BWMD)
as an alternative. The BWMD avoids the shortcomings of ear-
lier efforts, and allows us to tackle problems in variable length
DNA sequence clustering.BWMD is also more adaptable to
other domains, which we demonstrate on malware classifica-
tion tasks. Unlike other compression-based distance metrics
known to us, BWMD works by embedding sequences into a
fixed-length feature vector. This allows us to provide signif-
icantly improved clustering performance on larger malware
corpora, a weakness of prior methods.
1 Introduction
Compression algorithms can be used to measure the similar-
ity between arbitrary sequences with little required domain
knowledge or expertise. They have been used in bioinformat-
ics(Mantaci et al., 2008), time series classification and clus-
tering(Keogh et al., 2004), and malware analysis (Borbely,
2015). The bioinformatics and malware analysis domains can
be particularly attractive for compression-based similarity
measures. Both of these domains involve “short” sequences
of tens of thousands of steps, and can often reach 108 steps in
length. Other machine learning techniques often fail to work
when dealing with sequences of such variety and length.
In this work, we note that the Extended Burrows Wheeler
Transform (EBWT) (Mantaci et al., 2005) is a compression-
based distance metric designed explicitly around the Burrows
Wheeler Transform (BWT) (Burrows and Wheeler, 1994)
algorithm for use in bioinformatics. While EBWT has been
useful in that domain, we have discovered a number of weak-
nesses in this method that reduce its effectiveness and prevent
it from being useful in other domains, such as malware de-
tection.
To remedy these issues, we develop a new BWT-inspired
distance measure that we refer to as the Burrows Wheeler
Markov Distance (BWMD). Unlike EBWT, BWMD is a
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valid1 distance metric, and can scale to far larger problems
that EBWT cannot tackle due to computational limits. Com-
pared to other compression-based distances, our BWMD is
the first to work by embedding a sequence into a Euclidean
vector space. This gives a significant advantage to our ap-
proach in terms of clustering and query speed. This advan-
tage is achieved by using algorithms that are designed around
Euclidean distance, like k-means, that other methods cannot
leverage.
We will begin by reviewing related work in the compres-
sion distance space, and the needed details of the BWT, the
prior method EBWT, and a related method known as LZJD, in
§ 2. Next we will begin with a description of the new BWMD
in § 3. In § 4 we will develop a number of new theoretical in-
sights, proving 1) how EBWT has dramatic failure cases that
violate our intuition of how a distance measure should work,
2) that BWMD does not have these failure cases, and 3) com-
paring how EBWT, BWMD, and LZJD handle randomness,
and 4) that BWMD has unique properties in this regard. We
will then move into empirical results in § 5 by comparing
BWMD with EBWT on DNA sequence clustering, where
we show that BWMD is able to cluster DNA sequences of
varying lengths that EBWT fails to cluster in a meaningful
way. In § 6 we will show how BWMD is able to scale to
malware classification and clustering tasks that are beyond
EBWT’s computational ability. Though LZJD provides better
classification accuracy at this task, BWMD provides superior
clustering results. Finally we will conclude in § 7
2 Compression Distances
Compression in general can be seen as one way of perform-
ing many machine learning tasks, and has deep connections
to statistical methods. Following this intuition, Li et al. (2004)
introduced the Normalized Information Distance (NID) as
a method of measuring similarity using compression. Given
a function K(x) that computes the Kolmogorov complexity
(i.e., return the length of the shortest computer program that
produces x as output), and the associated conditional Kol-
mogorov complexity K(x|y) (i.e., the length of the shortest
computer program that produces x as output given y as in-
put), the NID is a metric as defined in (1). The Kolmogorov
1A distance metric is considered true, or valid, if it adheres to
the properties of reflexivity, symmetry, and triangularity.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
13
04
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
0 D
ec
 20
19
complexities are uncomputable functions, making NID of no
practical use.
NID(x, y) =
max (K(x|y),K(y|x))
max (K(x),K(y))
(1)
To remedy this situation, Li et al. (2004) went on to present
the Normalized Compression Distance (NCD), which re-
places the uncomputable K(x) with C(x), which returns the
length of x in bytes after running a compression algorithm.
To approximate K(x|y), the concatenation of x and y (de-
noted by x‖y) is used, giving the final form of NCD in (2).
The compression algorithm chosen impacts the quality of the
results. The bzip and LZMA algorithms have been popular
due to a combination of reasonable run time performance and
generally satisfactory compression ratios.
NCD(x, y) =
C(x‖y)−min (C(x), C(y))
max (C(x), C(y))
(2)
Where C(x) is the (integer) length of object x when com-
pressed. NCD, and compression-based distances in general,
do not require significant feature engineering to be applied in
practice. This has made them popular for genomic phylogeny
(Li et al., 2004; Cilibrasi and Vitanyi, 2005) and malware
analysis (Bayer et al., 2009; Apel et al., 2009; Bailey et al.,
2007; Karim et al., 2005), where sequences are longer than
what most other techniques can handle (104 − 108 steps in
length), and it can be difficult to extract more sophisticated
features manually. However, using compression algorithms
naively in NCD leads to difficulties with computational scal-
ability and reduced accuracy/failure cases due to the fact that
compression algorithms were not designed for similarity anal-
ysis (Borbely, 2015; Cebrián et al., 2005). For these reasons,
some have looked at converting known clustering algorithms
into explicit distance measures. For example, the Lempel Ziv
Jaccard Distance (LZJD) (Raff and Nicholas, 2017a) con-
verts the LZMA algorithm into a true distance measure, and
for malware classification tasks has superior accuracy and
runtime compared to NCD2.
2.1 Extended Burrows Wheeler Transform
Table 1: BWT
F Rotation L
$ $easypeasy y
a asy$easype e
a asypeasy$e e
e easy$easyp p
e easypeasy$ $
p peasy$easy y
s sy$easypea a
s sypeasy$ea a
y y$easypeas s
y ypeasy$eas s
The Burrows Wheeler Transform
(BWT) (Burrows and Wheeler,
1994) is a core component of the
bzip compression algorithm, and
has been widely used in infor-
mation retrieval applications due
to its ability to accelerate search
queries(Ferragina and Manzini,
2005). The BWT takes an in-
put string u of length n = |u|,
over an alphabet Σ, and pro-
duces a new string u′ = bwt(u).
Through the use of an end-of-file
(EoF) marker, the BWT is invert-
ible, so u can be recovered from u′ without loss.
2A Java (Raff and Nicholas, 2018b) and Python (Raff et al.,
2019) implementations of LZJD are available.
BWT’s utility in compression is best understood through
example. Consider Table 1, where the BWT transform of the
string “easypeasy” is shown. BWT adds a special EoF marker
“$”, and lexicographically sorts every single-character rota-
tion of the string (observe column F, which is in sorted order).
The BWT output is then the last column of each string, shown
in column L. By computing the BWT version of the string,
we can see how runs of the same character (“ee”, “aa”, “ss”)
have been created that previously did not exist. Simple run-
length encoding can then be applied to produce a compressed
version of the string.
These sorted rotations can be computed in O(n) time,
and provide a simple method of compression. To turn this
into a distance measure, Mantaci et al. (2005) developed the
Extended Burrows Wheeler Transform (EBWT). The EBWT
works by defining the BWT over a pair of inputs u and v, and
computing the sorted order of both sequences. An example
of this is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: EBWT computation example
bwt(u=bcaa) bwt(v=ccbab) EBWT Merge Source
a a b c a b c c b a a b c u
a b c a b a b c c a b c a u
b c a a b c c b a a b c c b v
c a a b c b a b c b a b c c v
-- c c b a b b c a a u
-- -- b c c b a v
-- -- c a a b u
-- -- c b a b c v
-- -- c c b a b v
The distance between the two sequences u and v is defined
by (3), where rep(i) returns how many times the i’th source
occurred in a row, and that only t source transitions occurred.
ebwt(u, v) =
t∑
i=1
max(rep(i)− 1, 0) (3)
Again, this concept is easier understood through example.
Considering Table 2, we can see that the source string se-
quence is uuvvuvuvv. If we group this by transitions, we
get u2v2uvuv2. Thus the distance ebwt(u, v) = 1 + 1 + 0 +
0 + 0 + 1 = 3.
Mantaci et al. (2005) developed the EBWT for applications
in bioinformatics, and developed theory to show a number of
situations under which the EBWT will perform well or have
desirable properties. However, it is still expensive to compute,
requiring O(|u|+ |v|) time for every distance computation.
This makes EBWT less attractive as bioinformatic sequences
become longer, and reduces its utility in other domains in
which compression distances have found use, such as mal-
ware classification. While it was known that EBWT did not
satisfy the triangle inequality, preventing it from being a true
distance metric, previously unreported theoretical issues also
exist. We will discuss these issues in § 4.
3 Burrows Wheeler Markov Distance
Inspired by the prior work we have just discussed, we now de-
velop a new distance measure based on the Burrows Wheeler
Transform. We will refer to our method as the Burrows
Wheeler Markov Distance (BWMD), and it is simple to im-
plement. To begin, consider again Table 1, where BWT(“easy-
peasy”) is shown. The BWT’s effectiveness as a compression
algorithm comes explicitly from its ability to re-order the con-
tent such that repetitions are reduced to a first-order occur-
rence. This is why run-length encoding is effective. Because
first-order compression is independently effective after the
BWT, we do not need to consider more complex interactions
over the extent of a file.
We also do not care about the invertibility of any trans-
form. Our goal is to define a new feature space where we
can perform effective machine learning and information re-
trieval. So we seek to build a small statistical summary of the
data, rather than build an object from which we can recreate
the original data. By measuring the similarity of these small
summaries, we measure the similarity of the underlying se-
quences. Given that first-order compression is effective with
the BWT, we chose to select a first-order statistical model. In
particular, we can use a Markov model of the probability of
observing token u′i given the previous token u
′
i−1. The tran-
sition matrix T ∈ R|Σ|×|Σ| can then be used as a statistical
summary of the entire sequence BWT(u).
This is all that is needed to describe BWMD, and a succinct
description is given below. Each step takes O(n) time for
an input sequence of n bytes. 1[z] is the indicator function,
which returns 1 if z is true, and 0 otherwise, and α, β are the
rows and columns of the transition matrix.
1. For each sequence u in a corpus of size N
2. Compute u′ = BWT(u)
3. Estimate flattened Markov transition vector
x[α+ β · |Σ|] = 1|u′| − 1
|u′|∑
i=2
1
[
u′i = α ∧ u′i−1 = β
]
4. Normalize x such that x[i] =
√
x[i]/
√
2.
After step (4) in the above process, we obtain from the
input u a single feature vector x which we might use, in place
of u, in machine learning or information retrieval algorithms.
Regardless of the length of the input sequence u, the size of
the vector x will depend only on the alphabet size |Σ|. When
working on raw bytes, this would be a 2562 feature vector.
While such a vector takes up to 256 KB per sequence u, the
individual input data objects we consider in this work range
from 1 MB in size up to 400 MB. This makes the BWMD
description quite compact by comparison. When u is shorter
in length, the vector x can be stored in a sparse form, making
the memory cost O(min(|u|, |Σ|2))
The normalization in step (4) is also chosen intentionally.
The Hellinger Distance is a metric over probability distribu-
tions. For the case of two discrete probability distributions
P = (p1, . . . , pk) and Q = (q1, . . . , qk), the Hellinger Dis-
tance is defined as follows:
H(P,Q) =
1√
2
√√√√ k∑
i=1
(
√
pi −√qi)2 (4)
Due to the form of (4), the Hellinger distance corresponds
to the Euclidean distance between two transformed and scaled
versions of P and Q. By using the square root of the coeffi-
cients in step (4), divided by
√
2, we have a feature vector
x that has been placed into a space where the Euclidean dis-
tance can be computed as usual. The results are then equiva-
lent to the Hellinger distance between Markov transition vec-
tors, giving us a statistically sound interpretation for BWMD.
That the BWMD is a valid distance metric also follows imme-
diately from the use of the Euclidean distance, which is well
known to be a valid metric, a property that the EBWT lacks.
We explicitly use the Hellinger distance over other alterna-
tives, like KL-Divergence, because it corresponds exactly to
the Euclidean distance after transformation. This makes is a
valid distance metric for which we can make mathematical
statements about its behavior with little work, and prove it
does not have the same shortcomings as prior methods in this
space. In addition, most other clustering and fast retrieval
algorithms are built around the Euclidean distance, making
our method compatible with a maximal number of compli-
mentary techniques. This is not the case for any prior com-
pression based measure. The ability to use algorithms like
k-means, where other alternatives cannot, provides BWMD
with advantages in terms of clustering accuracy, as well as
computational efficiency to handle big data.
Note that because of the BWT, our approach is not equiva-
lent to 2-grams. Our comparison with LZJD, which can be in-
terpreted as adaptive variable-length gram(Raff and Nicholas,
2017b), and BitShred, which uses 16-grams, will show that
our method is meaningfully more effective than simple n-
gram approaches.
4 Theoretical Results
We begin by developing a stronger theoretical understand-
ing of our new method, as well as the prior approach EBWT.
Prior works have looked at a number of properties of the
EBWT(Mantaci et al., 2007, 2008, 2005), and describe situa-
tions in which EBWT will behave as a metric for a subset of
possible inputs, and that it is invertible like the standard BWT.
However, our interest in BWT is as a general purpose simi-
larity measure for information retrieval and machine learning
applications. We begin by showing three undesirable prop-
erties of the EBWT that reduce our confidence in its use for
such applications. Then we will investigate the nature of our
new BWMD in these same cases where EBWT might fail.
4.1 EBWT Shortcomings
First we show a simple property that is a direct result of the
EBWT measuring distance as a function of repeated source
sequences. When we have two strings u and v in any alphabet
Σ, it is necessarily the case that the distance is bounded below
by the difference in sequence lengths |u| and |v|. If u and
v differ significantly, we are unlikely to be able to make
meaningful similarity comparisons.
Theorem 1. The distance ebwt(u, v) ≥ ||u| − |v|| − 1.
Proof. Consider any two strings u and v. The minimum dis-
tance involves the maximum number of transitions between
string sources. If |u| < |v|, that means there can be at most
2 · |u| transitions, going back and forth between u and v on
the merging. That necessitates |v| − |u| repetitions at the end.
Given the definition of ebwt in (3), that means the minimum
distance between u and v must be |v| − |u| − 1.
The above result leads us to suspect that EBWT will not
be useful when the sequences being compared are of varying
lengths. The greater the difference in sequence length, the
more troubling this issue might become. Given the insight
from Theorem 1, we move on to a more serious departure
from our intuition of how a distance measure should behave.
In particular, if u is a subset of v, we should expect the
distance between u and v to be small. Instead, it is possible
for EBWT to return the maximal distance under this scenario.
Theorem 2. It is possible for ebwt(u, v) = |v|+ |u|−2, the
maximum possible distance, even if u ⊂ v.
Proof. Consider the string u = an1 and v = an2 , such
that n2 > n1, |u| = n1 and |v| = n2. Because of the
topographical sorting, all rotations of u and v will have
the same characters, and so the sorting will only resolve
once the max substring length is reached. Since all rota-
tions in u are of length n1, which is shorter than n2, a
sorting will place all rotations of u before any rotations of
v. This results in a transition pattern of un1vn2 , and thus
ebwt(u, v) = n1 − 1 + n2 − 1 = |u|+ |v| − 2.
Theorem 2 defies our expectations in the case of similar
inputs. If we use the behavior of the NID from (1), we would
expect the distance in this scenario to be small. Consider
the proof’s example with u = an1 and v = an2 : we would
expect NID(u,v) ≤ log(n2/n1). This is because v could
be encoded as the sequence u repeated n2/n1 times, which
in the worst case, can be represented in a number of bits
logarithmic in the value being encoded (i.e., the nature of any
big-integer representation is that the maximum value that can
be represented grows exponentially with a doubling of the
bits).
We now show that EBWT likewise surprises us in the case
of dissimilar inputs, where we can have u and v with no
overlap in content, but EBWT identifies as having maximal
similarity.
Theorem 3. It is possible for ebwt(u, v) = 0, even if there
exists no shared characters between u and v. More formally,
there exists u, v and an alphabet |Σ| ≥ |u|+ |v| such that for
every x ∈ u and z ∈ v, x /∈ v ∧ z /∈ u yet ebwt(u, v) = 0.
Proof. Let a‖b denote the concatenation of a and b, and∥∥N
i=1
i the sequential concatenation of 1, 2, . . . , N . Without
loss of generality, define the string u =
∥∥n0
i=1
2 · i and v =∥∥n0
i=1
2 · i + 1. Thus |u| = |v|, but in the lexicographical
sorting u and v will alternate between rotations u[0] = 2,
v[0] = 3, u[1] = 4, v[1] = 5, . . ., u[n0] = 2 · n0, v[n0] =
2 · n0 + 1. Thus ebwt(u, v) will always contain transitions
with no source repetition, hence ebwt(u, v) = 0.
The reader may note that the construction of Theorem 3
would allow one to argue that the scenario should return a
small distance under the ideal Kolmogorov distance with
NID. This could be argued because the construction of u and
v allows v to be represented as v = u + 1. However, the
same scenario can occur with randomized strings where the
alphabet does not increment with any simple pattern and is
filled with random tokens, so long as there is no overlap in the
tokens and the tokens “balance out” once sorted (i.e., there is
no f(·) s.t. v[i] = f(u[i]) yet v[i] > u[i]∧u[i+1] > v[i]∀i).
This requires further expanding the alphabet size |Σ|, and as
such makes Theorem 3 the least practical of our concerns.
However, we find it enlightening as a theoretical shortcoming
which we would prefer to avoid.
While these issues give us cause for concern, EBWT has
found use in practice. We will show in § 5 that our concern
for EBWT’s utility is more justified when sequences have
varying length.
4.2 Behaviors of BWMD
To delve into BWMD’s behavior, we will begin by analyzing
the same scenarios used to show our theoretical concerns
with the EBWT in the preceding section, as well as compare
the behavior of BWMD to that of the LZJD algorithm.
Corollary 1. Given u = an1 and v = an2 , such that n2 >
n1, then bwmd(u, v) = 0.
Proof. Under the construction of the embedding of u, xu ∈
R|Σ|, ‖x‖0 = 1 since there will be only one transition pattern
of a− > a. As such, the value at that index i will be xu[i] =√
1/
√
2 = 1/
√
2. Since the embedding xv will have the
same construction, and thus, xu[i] − xv[i] = 0, and ∀j 6=
i, xu[j] = xv[j] = 0. Therefore, the distance between u and
v will be zero.
The above also does not conform to expectation with re-
spect to the NID, because we are ignoring the length of the
inputs in our computation of distances. The NID(u,v) would
be greater than zero in this scenario and is necessitated by
storing the difference in repetition lengths n2 and n1. This
tells us BWMD will be less sensitive to differences in se-
quence length, which may be desirable or not, depending on
the application.
The behavior of LZJD in this scenario was used to prove
its sensitivity to potential repetition of the input. It was shown
that LZJD(an1 , an2) = 1−
√
8n1+1−1√
8n2+1−1 as a lower bound for
a similar scenario (Raff and Nicholas, 2017a). This distance
grows at a rate considerably faster than logarithmic, but is
also better than the EBWT distance in this case. We conclude
that both LZJD and BWMD have better behavior, but BWMD
will lower-bound the NID and LZJD will upper-bound the
NID.
In a similar manner as Corollary 1 was shown, the same
construction can be applied to Theorem 3’s issue for BWMD.
Corollary 2. For all u, v such that for every z ∈ v, x /∈ v
∧ z /∈ u, then bwmd(u, v) = 1, the maximum possible
distance.
The derivation follows from the fact that
∑k
i=1
√
pi
2 =∑k
i=1 pi = 1. This means the distance computation will
reduce to 1/
√
2
√
2 · 1 = 1. Therefore, the distance when the
embeddings xu and xv have no intersection is maximized. In
this case, BWMD aligns well with the behavior we would
expect from the NID. Likewise it is easy to see that LZJD
will return its maximum distance of 1 in this scenario as well.
LZJD measures the set intersection, so when the sets have no
intersection, then maximal distance is achieved.
5 Genomic Clustering
We begin by showing that our new BWMD has similar util-
ity as the original EBWT distance for genomic phylogeny
from DNA sequences. This was the original proposed use
of the EBWT measure, where they evaluated the Single-
Link Clustering results on mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
(Mantaci et al., 2005). Such data can be obtained using the
NIH GeneBank , which we have used to create a similar cor-
pus of DNA sequences to compare the relative pros and cons
of BWMD and EBWT. We will use both mtDNA as has been
done in prior work, but also a more challenging case with
chromosomal genomic scaffold DNA sequences. We will pro-
duce dendrograms for each tasks with Single-Link Clustering
(SLINK).
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Figure 1: Single-Link Clustering result on mitochondrial
mtDNA data.
First, we will evaluate mtDNA data on 28 different species,
and use Single-Link Clustering to produce a dendrogram of
the species based on their mtDNA. The results are shown
in Figure 1, with both EBWT and BWMD taking under 1
second to perform the clustering. Our goal is not to fully
evaluate the quality of each dendrogram, but to show that
both methods produce reasonable results in this case, which
may be of interest to researchers in bioinformatics. Both
EBWT and BWMD do reasonably well at this task, with
differing mistakes, advantages, and disadvantages.
EBWT gets most base level groups correct (e.g., lion, tiger,
cat in one group, primates grouped together). There is a
failure to properly group the harbor and gray seals as related
to each other, and instead act as outliers which SLINK is
forced into a cluster at the end at higher cost. EBWT also
fails to group the white rhino with other members of the
Ferungulates family (e.g., the horse and zebra would have
been closest members) (Cao et al., 1998). BWMD was able
to correctly pair the seals and placed white rhino with a larger
family of Ferungulates (closest to horse, which is correct,
and with the cows and yak which are members). But BWMD
failed to place the mouse and rat together, and dispersed the
zebra and lion from their more appropriate neighbors.
Results with both methods are reasonable. However, the
mtDNA task is an easier task. All of the mtDNA sequences
are of similar sizes, with the western grey kangaroo being
shortest at 15 KB in length and the lion being longest at 17
KB. Our theoretical results in § 4 would indicate that we may
see more significant issues if we had sequences of varying
length. We explore this with a dataset of chromosome ge-
nomic scaffold DNA for a subset of the species evaluated.
We selected one whole scaffold DNA sequence from a ran-
dom chromosome for the 11 species where this was available.
We selected “unplaced genomic scaffold” sequences for 3 re-
maining species (the yaks and tiger), which is a much shorter
and incomplete amount of data. This gives us a minimum
sequence size of 22 KB and a maximum of 33 MB.
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Figure 2: Single-Link Clustering on Genomic Scaffolding.
The SLINK results are shown in Figure 2. At a base level,
the cost to perform EBWT and its scalability issues are
more pronounced. BWMD takes only 47 seconds to perform
SLINK clustering. EBWT took 28 minutes, making it over
35× slower. When plotting the EBWT dendrogram in Fig-
ure 2b, we include the size of the DNA sequence in paren-
theses. When organized in this way, it becomes clear that the
EBWT clustering is degenerate, and corresponds exactly to
file-size, rather than content.
In contrast, the BWMD in Figure 2a produces reasonable
groupings despite disparate sequence lengths. For example,
(full scaffold) cat and (unplaced and incomplete) tiger are cor-
rectly grouped despite the cat sequence being 450× longer.
The BWMD results are not perfect: the orangutan and do-
mestic yak were placed farther from the other (well-grouped)
primates and ferungulates respectively. Overall we can see
that groups which should be placed near each other are, with-
out degrading to sequence length information.
We include LZJD ( Figure 2c )in this scenario, to demon-
strate that BWMD has increased value over other alternatives.
Here we can see that LZJD suffers the same failure as EBWT
in placing the three smallest partial segments into a single
cluster. With the exception of correctly grouping the two
chimpanzee species, the LZJD dendrogram is degenerate.
These results are in line with our theory derived in § 4.
When working with sequences of homogeneous length,
EBWT performed well. But BWMD is able to handle dis-
parate sequence lengths reasonably well, where EBWT de-
grades to grouping by sequence length rather than content.
BWMD’s ability to handle the original mtDNA data, as
well as substantially better results with the irregular-sized
scaffold DNA, is made more impressive by the fact that
BWMD is encoding everything into R16 due to the small
alphabet |Σ| = 4. This is a reduction in storage cost by a
factor of up to 515.6×, and allows for more flexibility in
creating a larger and searchable index using BWMD.
5.1 A note on BMWD’s Disadvantage
It is also worth noting that, from an information encoding per-
spective, BWMD is at a disadvantage in this testing over DNA
data. EBWT is dimensionless, and has the representation ca-
pacity of the merged sorting of two different strings, meaning
its representational capacity is a function of the sequence
length under consideration. BWMD encodes each sequence
into a fixed-length feature vector of size |Σ|2. Since we are
working with DNA data, the alphabet Σ = {A, T,C,G}
is quite small. As such all DNA sequences in these experi-
ments, up to 33 MB in size, are being embedded into a 16-
dimensional space. BWMD’s ability to match or outperform
EBWT means we must be doing a significantly better job at
leveraging the first-order information expressed by the Bur-
rows Wheeler Transform.
6 Malware Results
It can be difficult to reliably parse malicious software as
malware authors may intentionally violate rules and format
standards. Compression based similarity measures are useful
in this case as they allow us to avoid these complex pars-
ing issues. In this section we will look at the classification
accuracy of BWMD and LZJD for several datasets. Our ex-
pectation is that LZJD will have better classification accu-
racy, due to Lempel-Ziv compressors being more effective
than those based on Burrows Wheeler. However, we find that
BWMD has significant advantages when clustering is the
goal accuracy by up to 65.6×, and is 24× faster to search
large corpora by obtaining sub-linear scaling with no loss
in accuracy. Since LZJD cannot achieve this, this advantage
will only increase with corpus size.
Many prior works have looked at malware classification
and clustering by processing raw bytes, due to the difficulty of
parsing malware. We will compare with the seminal BitShred
algorithm (Jang et al., 2011) for clustering. Other similar
byte based distance functions such as Ssdeep and Sdhash
where evaluated, but founds to have degenerate performance
on our smallest and easiest corpora, which can be found
in appendix § 6.1. Compression distances such as EBWT
and NCD are not evaluated in this section, because it would
require multiple compute months for our smallest dataset,
and simply cannot scale to the size of our malware corpora.
Table 3: Malware datasets used in experiments.
Dataset Avg Size # Classes Train Test Storage Size
EMBER 1.17 MB 2 600,000 200,000 936 GB
VS20F 705 KB 20 160,000 40,000 141 GB
Kaggle Bytes 4.67 MB 9 10,868 — 50.8 GB
Kaggle ASM 13.5 MB 9 10,868 — 147 GB
Drebin APK 1.37 MB 20 4,664 — 6.4 GB
Drebin TAR 1.84 MB 20 4,664 — 8.6 GB
For our evaluation, we will use several datasets summa-
rized in Table 3. The EMBER dataset (Anderson and Roth,
2018) pertains to a binary classification problem of “benign
vs malicious” for Windows executables. Because there are
only two classes, clustering results will not be evaluated on
this corpus. However it is by far the largest corpus, allowing
us to explore the scalability of our algorithms. The raw files
can be obtained from VirusTotal (www.virustotal.com) and
are nearly 1TB total. Our remaining datasets will be multi-
class problems where each sample is a member of a specific
malware family. We will use these to evaluate both classifica-
tion accuracy, as well as accuracy in clustering with respect
to the class labels. Using VirusShare (Roberts, 2011) we cre-
ate another Windows based dataset with 20 malware fami-
lies. The families were determined using VirusTotal and the
AVClass tool which determines a single canonical malware
family label based on multiple Anti-Virus outputs (Sebastián
et al., 2016). We select the 20 most populous families, and
use 7,000 examples for training and 3,000 for testing. The
last four datasets we use are evaluated in “two forms”, fol-
lowing prior work (Raff and Nicholas, 2017a). The Kaggle
datasets are from a 2015 Kaggle competition sponsored by
Microsoft (Ronen et al., 2018). In the “Bytes” version our
algorithms are run on the raw malware binary, and in the
“ASM” version the output of IDA-Pro’s disassembler is used
instead. From the Drebin corpus (Arp et al., 2014) we use
the 20 most populous families, where the “APK” version is
the raw bytes of the Android APK (essentially a Zip file with
light compression), and the “TAR” version which unpacks
the APK and recombines all content into a single tar file.
6.1 Malware Classification
We begin our analysis by looking at nearest neighbor classi-
fication performance of various methods. The performance
of each algorithm under this scenario gives us insight not
only to its utility, but how effective it would be for analysts
in finding similar malware. Utility in this scenario requires
both high accuracy and computational efficiency, as malware
corpora are often measured in the terabyte to petabyte range.
Small Scale Malware Classification The Kaggle and
Drebin corpora are considerably smaller in size, allowing
us to test a wider selection of methods against them. In the
below table we use balanced accuracy, where the weights of
each file are adjusted so that the total weight of each class is
equal, because malware families are not evenly distributed in
each corpus.
Table 4: Balanced Accuracy results for 1-NN classification
on each dataset. Results show mean 10-Fold Cross Validation
accuracy (standard deviation in parentheses). Best results in
bold, second best in italics.
Dataset Ssdeep Sdhash BitShred BWMD LZJD
Kaggle Bytes 38.4 (1.4) 60.2 (2.3) 43.7 (1.9) 96.4 (2.2) 97.9 (1.4)
Kaggle ASM 26.6 (2.2) 28.8 (1.3) 36.9 (1.6) 97.0 (1.8) 97.1 (1.7)
Drebin APK 13.6 (1.6) 5.8 (0.5) 58.3 (3.9) 55.3 (4.4) 81.0 (4.0)
Drebin TAR 24.2 (2.9) 8.3 (1.2) 65.1 (3.7) 76.3 (3.6) 87.9 (2.1)
We can see from these results that the compression-based
approaches, LZJD and BWMD, generally outperform other
alternatives by a wide margin. As was expected, LZJD has
higher accuracy that BWMD, since LZJD is based on a more
effective compression algorithm. While this is a slight weak-
ness of BWMD, its advantage comes in being orders of mag-
nitude faster, as we will show in the large scale testing in the
next section. This makes it the only method usable for larger-
scale corpora. This also shows that Ssdeep and Sdhash are
simply not accurate enough to be considered for use, without
regard to computational constraints.
BWMD performed second best on every dataset, the only
exception being a 3 point difference to the BitShred algo-
rithm. However, BWMD outperformed BitShred by at least
11 points on all other datasets. Supporting our theoretical anal-
ysis in § 4, we also see hints that BWMD is better equipped to
work with extremely long sequences. Most notably, BWMD
is the only method which had improved accuracy and reduced
variance when moving from Kaggle Bytes (4.67 MB) to Kag-
gle ASM (13.5 MB). This suggests that the disassembly may
be in a form that allows the BWT to better capture first-order
dependencies for compression.
The fact that BWMD has non-trivial accuracy on Drebin
APK (random guessing is 5%) is particularly impressive and
worth noting. This is because the APK files are essentially
Zip files with a standard structure, and the Zip compression
format is a more effective one than most BWT based methods
such as bzip. As such, that there is any first-order information
exploitable for effective similarity search is impressive, and
indicates the utility of BWMD in wider applications.
Large Scale Malware Classification On EMBER we use
9-Nearest Neighbors as our classifier so that we can compute
meaningful values for the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC)
(Bradley, 1997). In this malware detection context, AUC can
be interpreted as an algorithm’s ability to properly prioritize
all malicious software above all benign software. This metric
is useful for prioritizing work queues, and is therefore partic-
ularly pertinent. We evaluate only BWMD and LZJD due to
computational constraints on this larger dataset.
BWMD obtains an AUC of 98.3%, where LZJD acheives
a slightly better 99.7% AUC. As expected, LZJD obtains a
higher accuracy than BWMD, because LZJD is built upon
a more effective compression algorithm. However, accuracy
in isolation does not determine what method is best to use.
Due to the large size of malware corpora, sub-linear scaling
is needed to be useful for realistic sized datasets.
BWMD does have an advantage over LZJD in its ability
to scale to large corpora in an efficient manner. This is criti-
cal, since industry datasets routinely require comparisons to
terabytes of files or more (Roussev, 2010). Prior work has
tried, with limited success, to scale LZJD to larger corpora.
Using an extension of the Vantage Point (VP) tree (Yiani-
los, 1993), only a 2.5x speedup over brute force search was
achieved(Raff and Nicholas, 2018a). Because BWMD op-
erates by embedding files into a Euclidean space, we can
leverage specialized algorithms like the Dynamic Continu-
ous Index (DCI) algorithm (Li and Malik, 2017) that only
work for the Euclidean distance. DCI works by projecting the
whole dataset down to different, random, embeddings, and
allows obtaining the true nearest neighbors in a fast and effi-
cient manner. LZJD is not compatible with such algorithms,
resulting in BWMD being better equipped for this task.
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Figure 3: Table shows 9-NN search retrieval speed on the Em-
ber test set (in milliseconds, y-axis, log-scale) as the number
of training points (x-axis, log-scale) increases.
In Figure 3 we compare the total query time of BWMD
and LZJD under different indices, as the training set size in-
creases from 64 files up to the full 600,000. We found the
VP tree of minimum variance (Raff and Nicholas, 2018a)
performed best compared to other algorithms like KD and
Cover-trees, and so only its results are included. In the dashed
line we show BWMD accelerated with the Dynamic Contin-
uous Index (DCI) algorithm (Li and Malik, 2017).
We can see that as the training corpus becomes larger, the
VP trees are able to get small constant factor speedups, but
are not able to reliably prune large portions of the search
space. Because BWMD is in Euclidean space, it is the only
method able to leverage the DCI algorithm and thus able
to get significant order-of-magnitude search speedups. This
combination makes BWMD 24× faster than LZJD (5.6 CPU
hours compared to 5.6 days), and 834× faster than BWMD
with a brute force search. One can clearly see that DCI’s scal-
ing is sub-linear, and its advantage grows with the corpus
size. This is obtained with no loss in accuracy on the Em-
ber corpus, making BWMD the only effective approach for
scaling to even larger corpora.
6.2 Malware Clustering
In this section we will show that BWMD has significant ad-
vantages in terms of clustering malware into families. This
benefit comes largely from BWMD mapping sequences into
a Euclidean feature space, where we can leverage tried-and-
true algorithms like k-means to perform fast and useful clus-
tering. LZJD is incompatible with k-means, and similar meth-
ods that require an explicit euclidean feature vector. As such
LZJD, like BitShred, is constrained to distance based cluster-
ing methods like agglomerative clustering. This puts them at
a significant disadvantage compared to BWMD.
Evaluating the quality of our clustering results, we will
consider three measures: Homogeneity, Completeness, and V-
Measure, as introduced by Rosenberg and Hirschberg (2007)
and using the class labels as ground truth cluster assignments.
Homogeneity measures how well an algorithm does at mak-
ing each found cluster as “pure” as possible (i.e., only one
class in each cluster). Completeness measures how well an
algorithm groups all examples of a class into as few clusters
as possible (i.e., all examples of one class in only one clus-
ter). V-Measure is the harmonic average of Homogeneity and
Completeness. All three metrics are measured on the scale
[0, 1], with 0 being worst, and 1 being the maximum score.
In performing the clustering, we will test using k = the true
number of classes and k = 10× the true number of classes.
The former (k = C) is done to judge how well the clustering
algorithms are able to recover the underlying ground truth.
The latter (k = 10 ·C) is done as it corresponds best to how a
malware analyst would desire to use these tools.It is easier to
over-estimate the number of clusters than to predict the exact
value of k, and by clustering an analyst would hope to reduce
their workload by quickly checking that files in the same
cluster are related, and then performing an in-depth analysis
on only a few representatives from each cluster (VanHoudnos
et al., 2017). For this reason, we consider Homogeneity the
most important of the three measures, as it corresponds with
how an analyst would use clustering, followed by V-Measure,
and then Completeness.
BWMD is the only method that can leverage the k-
Means algorithm, and we use Hamerly’s variant because
it avoids redundant computation while returning the exact
same results(Hamerly, 2010). For LZJD and BitShred we
use Average-Link clustering using a fast O(n2) algorithm
(Müllner, 2011). While the original BitShred paper used
Single-Link, we found Average link provided the best results
across all metrics for both BitShred and LZJD. The results
Table 5: Clustering performance of BWMD, LZJD, and Bit-
Shred. Best results shown in bold.
k = C k = 10 · C
Dataset Metric BWMD LZJD BitShred BWMD LZJD BitShred
Kaggle Bytes
V-M 0.581 0.352 0.007 0.546 0.414 0.028
Homog 0.597 0.254 0.003 0.885 0.378 0.015
Complt 0.566 0.573 0.239 0.396 0.457 0.265
Kaggle ASM
V-M 0.528 0.235 0.014 0.562 0.531 0.366
Homog 0.550 0.176 0.007 0.911 0.599 0.291
Complt 0.508 0.351 0.257 0.407 0.477 0.495
Drebin APK
V-M 0.307 0.219 0.095 0.412 0.326 0.389
Homog 0.296 0.172 0.054 0.566 0.313 0.333
Complt 0.319 0.303 0.375 0.323 0.340 0.468
Drebin TAR
V-M 0.403 0.248 0.065 0.508 0.478 0.386
Homog 0.416 0.177 0.036 0.754 0.503 0.332
Complt 0.391 0.413 0.335 0.383 0.455 0.460
VS20F
V-M 0.353 0.009 0.009 0.449 0.204 0.056
Homog 0.328 0.005 0.005 0.562 0.137 0.030
Complt 0.381 0.249 0.221 0.374 0.400 0.378
are shown in Table 5, where we can see BWMD dominates
LZJD and BitShred by our most important metrics, Homo-
geneity and V-Measure3. BWMD’s advantage in this regard
is often dramatic. For example, BWMD scores 2.34× better
on Homogeneity compared to LZJD when k = 10 · C on the
Kaggle bytes dataset, and 59× better than BitShred. While
BWMD does not always perform best by the Completeness
metric, it is always competitive with the best scoring method,
which is why BWMD dominates by V-Measure . The results
overall clearly indicate that BWMD provides the best clus-
terings across multiple datasets, of different encodings, and
different numbers of clusters, showing the flexibility of the
compression-based approach.
Because BWMD can leverage the k-means concept and
the many efficient algorithms for its computation, it is also
the most scalable for these methods. LZJD and BitShred are
inherently limited by the O(n2) lower-bound complexity of
hierarchical clustering 4 . For example, BWMD took only
27 minutes to over-cluster the 160,000 files in the VS20F
training set, the largest under consideration. This is 17.3×
faster than LZJD which took 7.76 hours, and 54.6× faster
than Bitshred at just over a day.
7 Conclusion
We have developed and introduced the Burrows Wheeler
Markov Distance (BWMD), a new distance metric inspired
by the Burrow Wheeler Transform. A theoretical analysis has
shown several ways in which BWMD has better behavior,
which is confirmed by showing new abilities for clustering
DNA sequences that prior methods could not handle. For
malware clustering, we have shown BWMD considerably
outperforms prior methods in both speed and accuracy, and
BWMD is the only byte-based method which can achieve
sub-linear search scaling on larger corpora.
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Appendix A Compression Distances With
High Entropy
As a final analysis, we will look at the behavior of EBWT,
LZJD, and our new BWMD in cases where input strings have
high entropy. Such situations are common in malware classi-
fication, due to the use of “packing”, where a malware author
will use compression and/or encryption to either reduce a
file’s size or hide its contents (Martignoni et al., 2007).
A.1 Similarity of Two Random Files
First we will consider the behavior when measuring the dis-
tance between two files, both of which are completely uni-
form random strings of characters, and so have a maximal
entropy −∑∀s∈Σ−ps log|Σ|(ps) = 1, where ps is the prob-
ability of observing character s from the alphabet Σ. For an
empirical perspective, in Figure 4 we show a contour plot of
the normalized distance (i.e., scaled to be in the range [0, 1])
over an alphabet |Σ| = 32. On the x and y axis are the lengths
of the random files being compared, and the value plotted is
the average normalized distance over 30 trials of different
random sequences for each trial. In the plot, dark blue indi-
cates a near zero distance, and dark red a distance near one.
For EBWT, the intuition is that random content will result
in a random ordering in the EBWT merge step, and thus
have a few source repetitions, and ultimately produce a small
normalized distance (i.e., ebwt(u, v)/(|u|+ |v|−2)). We can
see that EBWT follows this behavior, but has an unusual and
undesirable pattern of non-zero values for smaller sequences
(|u| ≤ 103). Along the diagonal of equal-length files, a value
of≈ 0.4 occurs, but then increases on the off diagonal, before
decreasing again once the size |u| > 103.
For BWMD, this analysis is more grounded. We know that
for a random sequence, the transformed BWT has nothing
it can compress, and will result in a different permutation
of the still random string. This means the distribution of the
prefix to every substring will not change (i.e., the preceding
character is random, which is true by definition), and so we
expect the transition vector x in step 3 of the BWMD to con-
verge toward the uniform distribution as the size of the input
string increases. So in the limit, we know two random files
will receive a distance near zero. However, if one (or both)
of the random files are sufficiently small, a large distance
will occur due to a lack of convergence toward the uniform
distributions. The rate of change will depend on the alphabet
size |Σ|, and can be described as the expected value of the
differences between transformed multinomial distributions.
While bounding this value mathematically is difficult, we can
see in Figure 4 that this expectation holds true empirically.
Because LZJD measures the similarity of compression dic-
tionaries from the Lempel Ziv algorithm, it was assumed
that distances would become smaller as the size of a random
sequence increased, due to the accumulation of all smallest
substrings (Raff and Nicholas, 2017a). We see in practice that
this does not quite occur. For sequences of significantly dif-
ferent length, LZJD returns a distance near 1, in part due to
the size difference forcing the intersection to be a small por-
tion of the union of two files. When two random sequences
are of a more similar length, we see that the LZJD distance
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Figure 4: Distance between two random files of different
lengths.
does begin to drop to nearly ≈ 0.6, but still remains rela-
tively high. This makes sense due to the random component
of the input strings. As the set of all shortest substrings is
constructed, consider the scenario where the compression dic-
tionary has all substrings of length α, but has only processed
half of the total sequence. For the remaining half, we will
obtain an essentially random sampling of strings of length
α + 1, of which there are |Σ| as many strings of increased
length (one for every character in the alphabet Σ, times every
string of length α). If two strings are of the same length, the
likelihood of seeing the same strings of length α + 1 then
becomes small, increasing the distance, while all strings of
size ≤ α increase the similarity and reduce distance.
Between BWMD and LZJD, we have two opposing styles
of measuring the distance between two high-entropy se-
quences. As was noted in (Raff and Nicholas, 2017a), one
could argue that two random sequences should have high
distance because they share no underlying information (this
is how NID would behave), or lower distance because both
sequences share the property of “looking random”. While
we argue that EBWT has a more confusing and inferior be-
havior, a preference to BWMD or LZJD’s behavior may be
task-specific.
A.2 High Entropy vs Low Entropy
An important distinction in behaviors on random sequences
is when a uniform random sequence (max entropy=1) is com-
pared to a second sequence with a different level of entropy.
For BWMD, we can derive intuition about its behavior in
this case from work on analyzing the BWT compression al-
gorithm. In particular, it has been shown that the BWT’s
efficiency at compression of k’th order combinations over
the alphabet Σ is bounded by k’th order empirical entropy
(Manzini, 2001). Thus we should anticipate that BWMD will
produce differing Markov transition matrices, and thus differ-
ing distances, as the entropy of the second sequence changes.
We confirm this empirically in Figure 55.
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Figure 5: Average distance (y-axis) between a primary se-
quence of length 105 that is uniformly random (entropy=1)
and a second sequence of a specific entropy between 0 and 1
(x-axis), and also of length 105.
We can see that LZJD and EBWT do not share this de-
sirable property of differing distance with differing entropy.
Given a single sequence of high entropy, LZJD will deem al-
5The results are shown only for the case of two sequences of
the same specific length. The general trend, that BWMD’s distance
changes as the entropy of one sequence changes, holds for other se-
quence length combinations as well — but such results are excluded
due to space limitations.
most all other entropy sequences equidistantly far, and EBWT
all other entropy sequences equidistantly near. In the case of
LZJD, this results in behavior effectively equivalent to when
the dimension of a problem continues to increase, and all
other points becoming increasing equidistant to each other
(Beyer et al., 1999). We believe BWMD’s ability to delineate
degrees of similarity/distance based on relative entropy lev-
els is an important factor toward its ability to provide better
clustering results compared to LZJD, which will be shown
later in § 6.
